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From: r_c_brown on 29 Jul 2010 14:48 On Jul 28, 1:45 pm, grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) wrote: > "r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com" <r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com> wrote innews:5d025827-a2b0-4049-8d90-801310c1faa3(a)h40g2000pro.googlegroups.com: > > > On Jul 27, 5:11 pm, grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) > > wrote: > >> RD Sandman <rdsandman(a)comcast[remove].net> wrote > >> innews:Xns9DC267B484A94hopewell(a)216.196.97.130: > > >> > grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) wrote in > >> >news:Xns9DC1E676A2FD0Wereofftoseethewizrd(a)216.196.97.142: > > >> >> RD Sandman <rdsandman(a)comcast[remove].net> wrote in > >> >>news:Xns9DC16A553659Chopewell(a)216.196.97.130: > > >> >>> Tankfixer <paul.carr...(a)gmail.com> wrote in > >> >>>news:MPG.26b66ffb1a91538498972e(a)news.eternal-september.org: > > >> >>>> In article <Xns9DBC54262ACBChopew...(a)216.196.97.130>, > >> >>>> rdsandman(a)comcast [remove].net says... > > >> >>>>> Michael Ejercito <mejer...(a)hotmail.com> wrote in > >> >>>>>news:f9397b30-34f0-4b9c-b92a-fc4c2da48972(a)k8g2000prh.googlegroups..co > >> >>>>>m: > > >> >>>>> > On Jul 20, 9:25 am, Lookout <mrLook...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >>>>> >> On Tue, 20 Jul 2010 08:47:01 -0700 (PDT), Michael Ejercito > > >> >>>>> >> <mejer...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: > >> >>>>> >> >On Jul 20, 4:24 am, Lookout <mrLook...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >>>>> >> >> On Mon, 19 Jul 2010 23:09:19 -0500, Liberal Hypocrite > >> >>>>> >> >> Detector > >> >>>>> >> >> >Um, no. > > >> >>>>> >> >> >http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0185.shtml > >> >>>>> >> >> >George W. Bush's military service began in 1968 when he > >> >>>>> >> >> >enlisted in t he Texas Air National Guard after graduating > >> >>>>> >> >> >with a bachelor's degree in history from Yale University. > >> >>>>> >> >> >The aircraft he was ultimately trained to fly was the > >> >>>>> >> >> >F-102 Delta Dagger, popularly known as "the Deuce." The > >> >>>>> >> >> >F-102 may have been old but was far from useless, and it > >> >>>>> >> >> >continued to serve in large numbers with both Air Force > >> >>>>> >> >> >and Air National Guard units well into th e 1970s. > >> >>>>> >> >> >Furthermore, the F-102 was deployed to Vietnam throughout > >> >>>>> >> >> >most of the conflict, and the aircraft proved its value > >> >>>>> >> >> >early by deterring No rth Vietnamese pilots from crossing > >> >>>>> >> >> >the border to attack the South. Perha ps > >> >>>>> >> >> >more importantly, the F-102 and its Air National Guard > >> >>>>> >> >> >pilots perform ed a vital role in defending the > >> >>>>> >> >> >continental United States from nuclear at tack. > > >> >>>>> >> >> >http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-10 > >> >>>>> >> >> >2 a- ops .ht m Four F-102s were sent from Clark AB, P. I., > >> >>>>> >> >> >to South Vietnam in March 1962, > >> >>>>> >> >> >after radars had detected low flying, unidentified aircraft > >> >>>>> >> >> >along the Cambodian border. This started a series of > >> >>>>> >> >> >rotations every 6 weeks by Navy > >> >>>>> >> >> >EA-1F all weather fighters and USAF F-102s to Tan Son Nhut. > >> >>>>> >> >> >The rotat ion > >> >>>>> >> >> >ended in May 1963 due to base overcrowding. Nonetheless, > >> >>>>> >> >> >from the sum mer of 1963 to mid 1964, Thirteenth Air Force > >> >>>>> >> >> >conducted no-notice deployment s of F-102s to South > >> >>>>> >> >> >Vietnam and brief training flights to Tan Son Nhut an d Da > >> >>>>> >> >> >Nang. The small number of aircraft committed to SEA air > >> >>>>> >> >> >defense be fore 1965 tripled by the end of 1966. At that > >> >>>>> >> >> >time 12 F-102s stood alert i n South Vietnam (6 at Bien > >> >>>>> >> >> >Hoa and 6 at Da Nang) and another 10 in Thai land (6 at > >> >>>>> >> >> >Udorn and 4 at Don Muang). Little change occurred in 1967 > >> >>>>> >> >> >and 1 968, the Air Force keeping a minimum of 14 F-102s on > >> >>>>> >> >> >5 minute alert with t he remainder of the force on 1 hour > >> >>>>> >> >> >call. F-102 operations in SEA end ed in > >> >>>>> >> >> >December 1969 (The last F-102 squadron at Clark was > >> >>>>> >> >> >inactivated. Howe ver, a few F-102s remained at the Royal > >> >>>>> >> >> >Thai Air Base of Don Muang until the summer of 1970.) with > >> >>>>> >> >> >a remarkable safety record. In almost 10 years of flying > >> >>>>> >> >> >air defense and a few combat air patrols for SAC B-52s, > >> >>>>> >> >> >just 1 5 F- 102s were lost. > > >> >>>>> >> >> His unit was at 100% when he was allowed to join. That's > >> >>>>> >> >> been documented repeatedly. Documented repeatedly by WHOM? > > >> >>>>> >> During the election. > >> >>>>> > The 1968 election? > > >> >>>>> >> >> There were NO NEW F-102 units be sent to Viet Nam WHEN HE > >> >>>>> >> >> JOINED. Therefore HE COULD NOT GO and his daddy knew that. > >> >>>>> >> >> The only one flying them were AD Air Force. > > >> >>>>> >> > And there was some sort of guarantee that it would not > >> >>>>> >> > change in the future? > > >> >>>>> >> Yes. It was OBSOLETE for combat in View Nam. > >> >>>>> > And when was it declared obsolete? > > >> >>>>> Sometime in the late 60s and early 70s. It was very viable for > >> >>>>> what it got used for and that was never a design criteria. It was > >> >>>>> designed and built to be an interceptor, not a rocket platform. > > >> >>>> Compared to the aircraft that NV could field it was very capable > > >> >>> So was an oxcart. > > >> >> That is really not fair. The Mig-21 in particular was a good > >> >> aircraft, better than most of it's pilots. > > >> > IIRC, the Mig-21 was not an NV AC. ;) > > >> MiG-17 and Mig-21 were the most numerous of what was supplied along with > >> some MiG-19s. > > >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_People%27s_Air_Force > > >> In 1965, the NVAF were supplied with supersonic MiG-21s by the USSR > >> which were used for high speed GCI controlled hit and run intercepts > >> against USAF strike groups. The MiG-21 tactics became so effective, that > >> by late 1966, an operation was mounted to especially deal with the > >> MiG-21 threat. Led by Colonel Robin Olds on January 2, 1967, Operation > >> Bolo lured MiG-21s into the air, thinking they were intercepting a F-105 > >> strike group, but instead found a sky full of missile armed F-4 Phantom > >> II Phantoms set for aerial combat. The result was a loss of almost half > >> the inventory of MiG-21 interceptors, at a cost of no US losses. The > >> VPAF (NVAF) stood down for additional training after this setback. > > >>http://www.acepilots.com/vietnam/viet_aces.html > > >> North Vietnamese Aces > >> MiG-17 and MiG-21 pilots, Phantom and "Thud" Killers > > >> I also have several books on the Vietnam Airwar. Most defintitely > >> MiG-21s. > > > I would be very interested in these books. I believe that it was at > > your recommendation that I have "Thud Ridge: F-105 Thunderchief > > missions over Vietnam", not to mention "At Dawn We Slept" (obviously, > > not of Vietnam vintage). > > >> > The biggest drawback, aside from the > >> >> lack of a well developed pilot corps was soviet style tactics. For > >> >> the most part they operated under GCI and were never really given the > >> >> opportunity to operate independently. There is some evidence that a > >> >> few pilots, possibly Russians, were not always directly under GCI and > >> >> did much better then thier compatriots. > > >> > Yep. > > >> >> The entire Soviet system was, in my opinion and the study I've made > >> >> of it seriously flawed in that it tended to discourage the kind of > >> >> independence of thought and action which is an outstanding > >> >> characteristic of both US and Israeli pilots and aircrew. > > >> >> Soviet doctrine failed, not neccesarily the technology. > > >> > Technology has trouble succeeding without the human touch involved. > > >> What is bad for the communists is that the very essence of thier system > >> discourages the kind of independent thinking so crucial to good combat > >> pilots. GCI works if you cut loose the pilot at a certain point and if > >> the pilot is capable of independent thinking so he can react to the > >> situation. Soviet style GCI took the pilots right up to the shoot point > >> and required a command to open fire. These pilots were far to dependent > >> on thier controllers and did not operate with thier eyes out of the > >> aircraft enough. In cases where good NVA pilots mixed it up with US > >> pilots and shook off thier GCI they acquited themselves well, but there > >> were never enough of those pilots around. > > >> -- > >> "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, therefore, > >> be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not > >> to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean > >> everything or nothing at pleasure." > > >> Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, 1823 > > Thud Ridge was from RD. At Dawn We Slept was from me. Ah, thanks. My memory isn't what it use to be, and probably never was. :-) > I'll make a note and see > what I can pull off the shelf. A lot of what I have is for modelling purposes > but I like having history mixed in. > > BTW if you liked ADWS you need to read Miracle at Midway (same author). That's now on my purchase list. > I feel > it is a better written book mainly because the war was already on and there is > none of the political silliness and manuevering in it. It is just IJN and USN > prep for the battle in detail plus many details about the battle itself I > hadn't known before, which is saying something. > If Miracle at Midway is a better book than At Dawn We Slept, it will be a terrific book indeed. > Also Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy is also fabulous. I may have that on my list already; if not, it will be added. (I figure I'll be dead about twenty years or so before I finish reading all the books on my current list.) > These 3 > books together give a perspective that is much broader and deeper than almost > anything else I have read. I developed considerably more respect for the > junior officers and enlisted of the IJN and a lot less for the senior > commanders. Whatever positives Yamamoto may have had he really wasn't that > much of genius at least not in the context of how he was used in WWII. If I recall correctly, Genda had much to do with the planning, and wanted to carry it further than Yamamoto. > Despite > all the detailed planning for Pearl harbor I think you'll agree the attack > itself despite all the immediate damage was not a tactical victory at all.. The > focus on the battleships and not the facitlites was a tremendous error. The immediate damage was just that; the Japanese knew they couldn't take out the US, only slow it down enough to try to complete their southern plans. Had the attack included possession of Hawaii ... well, the results eventually would have been the same, but perhaps dragged out longer. > And > Midway with it's set piece metality and divided forces and the grievous > underestimation of American capabilities was catastrophic. Could it be said > that Yamamoto actually won any battle? Perhaps like the Allies realized Hitler > did them more good alive than dead and stopped all attempts to assasinate him > in '43 perhaps Yamamoto should have been left to plan some more of his grand > battles. > Huh; hadn't thought of that. Of course, I'm not a real historian by any stretch; I'd have to study a few more years just to reach amateur status. > -- > "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, therefore, be > construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be > sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean everything > or nothing at pleasure." > > Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, 1823
From: r_c_brown on 29 Jul 2010 14:58 On Jul 29, 9:16 am, RD Sandman <rdsandman(a)comcast[remove].net> wrote: > "r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com" <r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com> wrote in news:5d025827- > a2b0-4049-8d90-801310c1f...(a)h40g2000pro.googlegroups.com: > > > > > I would be very interested in these books. I believe that it was at > > your recommendation that I have "Thud Ridge: F-105 Thunderchief > > missions over Vietnam", not to mention "At Dawn We Slept" (obviously, > > not of Vietnam vintage). > > You should also read "Going Downtown". Same author as Thud Ridge and the > subtitle is "The War Against Hanoi and Washington". A McNamara/Johnson > fan he wasn't. Thanks; that is now on my (ever growing) list. > > Broughton was my old CO. He also wrote Rupert Red Two, A Fighter Pilot's > Life from Thunderbolts to Thunderchiefs. There wasn't a man in that > squadron that wouldn't have followed him to hell. > > -- > Sleep well tonight, > > RD (The Sandman) > > The three stages of our economy....... > > Recession - You neighbor loses his job... > > Depression - You lose your job... > > Recovery - Obama loses his....
From: Gray Ghost on 30 Jul 2010 01:36
"r_c_brown(a)hushmail.com" <r_c_brown(a)hushmail.com> wrote in news:6e31cab8-3fe4-4e4f-ba83-936a02f86eec(a)y12g2000prb.googlegroups.com: > On Jul 28, 1:45�pm, grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) > wrote: >> "r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com" <r_c_br...(a)hushmail.com> wrote >> innews:5d025827-a2b0-4049-8d90-801310c1faa3(a)h40g2000pro.googlegroups.com: >> >> > On Jul 27, 5:11�pm, grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) >> > wrote: >> >> RD Sandman <rdsandman(a)comcast[remove].net> wrote >> >> innews:Xns9DC267B484A94hopewell(a)216.196.97.130: >> >> >> > grey_ghost471-newsgro...(a)yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) wrote in >> >> >news:Xns9DC1E676A2FD0Wereofftoseethewizrd(a)216.196.97.142: >> >> >> >> RD Sandman <rdsandman(a)comcast[remove].net> wrote in >> >> >>news:Xns9DC16A553659Chopewell(a)216.196.97.130: >> >> >> >>> Tankfixer <paul.carr...(a)gmail.com> wrote in >> >> >>>news:MPG.26b66ffb1a91538498972e(a)news.eternal-september.org: >> >> >> >>>> In article <Xns9DBC54262ACBChopew...(a)216.196.97.130>, >> >> >>>> rdsandman(a)comcast [remove].net says... >> >> >> >>>>> Michael Ejercito <mejer...(a)hotmail.com> wrote in >> >> >>>>>news:f9397b30-34f0-4b9c-b92a-fc4c2da48972(a)k8g2000prh.googlegroups >> >> >>>>>.co m: >> >> >> >>>>> > On Jul 20, 9:25�am, Lookout <mrLook...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >>>>> >> On Tue, 20 Jul 2010 08:47:01 -0700 (PDT), Michael Ejercito >> >> >> >>>>> >> <mejer...(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >> >> >>>>> >> >On Jul 20, 4:24�am, Lookout <mrLook...(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> >>>>> >> >> On Mon, 19 Jul 2010 23:09:19 -0500, Liberal Hypocrite >> >> >>>>> >> >> Detector >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Um, no. >> >> >> >>>>> >> >> >http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0185.shtml >> >> >>>>> >> >> >George W. Bush's military service began in 1968 when he >> >> >>>>> >> >> >enlisted in t �he Texas Air National Guard after >> >> >>>>> >> >> >graduating with a bachelor's degree in history from Yale >> >> >>>>> >> >> >University. The aircraft he was ultimately trained �to >> >> >>>>> >> >> >fly was the F-102 Delta Dagger, popularly known as "the >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Deuce." The F-102 �may have been old but was far from >> >> >>>>> >> >> >useless, and it continued to serve in �large numbers >> >> >>>>> >> >> >with both Air Force and Air National Guard units well >> >> >>>>> >> >> >into th �e 1970s. Furthermore, the F-102 was deployed to >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Vietnam throughout most �of the conflict, and the >> >> >>>>> >> >> >aircraft proved its value early by deterring No �rth >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Vietnamese pilots from crossing the border to attack the >> >> >>>>> >> >> >South. Perha �ps more importantly, the F-102 and its Air >> >> >>>>> >> >> >National Guard pilots perform �ed a vital role in >> >> >>>>> >> >> >defending the continental United States from nuclear at >> >> >>>>> >> >> >�tack. >> >> >> >>>>> >> >> >http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f >> >> >>>>> >> >> >-10 2 a- ops .ht �m Four F-102s were sent from Clark AB, >> >> >>>>> >> >> >P. I., to South Vietnam in March �1962, >> >> >>>>> >> >> >after radars had detected low flying, unidentified >> >> >>>>> >> >> >aircraft along the Cambodian border. This started a >> >> >>>>> >> >> >series of rotations every 6 weeks by �Navy � >> >> >>>>> >> >> >EA-1F all weather fighters and USAF F-102s to Tan Son >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Nhut. The rotat �ion >> >> >>>>> >> >> >ended in May 1963 due to base overcrowding. Nonetheless, >> >> >>>>> >> >> >from the sum �mer of 1963 to mid 1964, Thirteenth Air >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Force conducted no-notice deployment �s of F-102s to >> >> >>>>> >> >> >South Vietnam and brief training flights to Tan Son Nhut >> >> >>>>> >> >> >an �d Da Nang. The small number of aircraft �committed >> >> >>>>> >> >> >to SEA air defense be �fore 1965 tripled by the end of >> >> >>>>> >> >> >1966. At that time 12 F-102s stood alert i �n South >> >> >>>>> >> >> >Vietnam (6 at Bien Hoa and 6 at Da Nang) and another 10 >> >> >>>>> >> >> >in Thai �land (6 at Udorn and 4 at Don Muang). Little >> >> >>>>> >> >> >change occurred in 1967 and 1 968, the Air Force keeping >> >> >>>>> >> >> >a minimum of 14 F-102s on 5 minute alert with t �he >> >> >>>>> >> >> >remainder of the force on 1 hour call. F-102 operations >> >> >>>>> >> >> >�in SEA end �ed in December 1969 (The last F-102 >> >> >>>>> >> >> >squadron at Clark was inactivated. Howe �ver, a few >> >> >>>>> >> >> >F-102s remained at the Royal Thai Air Base of Don Muang >> >> >>>>> >> >> >until the summer of 1970.) with a remarkable safety >> >> >>>>> >> >> >record. In almost 10 years �of flying >> >> >>>>> >> >> >air defense and a few combat air patrols for SAC B-52s, >> >> >>>>> >> >> >just 1 �5 F- 102s were lost. >> >> >> >>>>> >> >> His unit was at 100% when he was allowed to join. That's >> >> >>>>> >> >> been documented repeatedly. � Documented repeatedly by >> >> >>>>> >> >> WHOM? >> >> >> >>>>> >> During the election. >> >> >>>>> > � �The 1968 election? >> >> >> >>>>> >> >> There were NO NEW F-102 units be sent to Viet Nam WHEN HE >> >> >>>>> >> >> JOINED. Therefore HE COULD NOT GO and his daddy knew >> >> >>>>> >> >> that. The only one flying them were AD Air Force. >> >> >> >>>>> >> > � And there was some sort of guarantee that it would not >> >> >>>>> >> > change in �the future? >> >> >> >>>>> >> Yes. It was OBSOLETE for combat in View Nam. >> >> >>>>> > � �And when was it declared obsolete? >> >> >> >>>>> Sometime in the late 60s and early 70s. �It was very viable for >> >> >>>>> what it got used for and that was never a design criteria. �It >> >> >>>>> was designed and built to be an interceptor, not a rocket >> >> >>>>> platform. >> >> >> >>>> Compared to the aircraft that NV could field it was very capable >> >> >> >>> So was an oxcart. >> >> >> >> That is really not fair. The Mig-21 in particular was a good >> >> >> aircraft, better than most of it's pilots. >> >> >> > IIRC, the Mig-21 was not an NV AC. �;) >> >> >> MiG-17 and Mig-21 were the most numerous of what was supplied along >> >> with some MiG-19s. >> >> >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_People%27s_Air_Force >> >> >> In 1965, the NVAF were supplied with supersonic MiG-21s by the USSR >> >> which were used for high speed GCI �controlled hit and run intercepts >> >> against USAF strike groups. The MiG-21 tactics became so effective, >> >> that by late 1966, an operation was mounted to especially deal with >> >> the MiG-21 threat. Led by Colonel Robin Olds on January 2, 1967, >> >> Operation Bolo lured MiG-21s into the air, thinking they were >> >> intercepting a F-105 strike group, but instead found a sky full of >> >> missile armed F-4 Phantom II �Phantoms set for aerial combat. The >> >> result was a loss of almost half the inventory of MiG-21 >> >> interceptors, at a cost of no US losses. The VPAF (NVAF) stood down >> >> for additional training after this setback. >> >> >>http://www.acepilots.com/vietnam/viet_aces.html >> >> >> North Vietnamese Aces >> >> MiG-17 and MiG-21 pilots, Phantom and "Thud" Killers >> >> >> I also have several books on the Vietnam Airwar. Most defintitely >> >> MiG-21s. >> >> > I would be very interested in these books. �I believe that it was at >> > your recommendation that I have "Thud Ridge: F-105 Thunderchief >> > missions over Vietnam", not to mention "At Dawn We Slept" (obviously, >> > not of Vietnam vintage). >> >> >> > �The biggest drawback, aside from the >> >> >> lack of a well developed pilot corps was soviet style tactics. For >> >> >> the most part they operated under GCI and were never really given >> >> >> the opportunity to operate independently. There is some evidence >> >> >> that a few pilots, possibly Russians, were not always directly >> >> >> under GCI and did much better then thier compatriots. >> >> >> > Yep. >> >> >> >> The entire Soviet system was, in my opinion and the study I've >> >> >> made of it seriously flawed in that it tended to discourage the >> >> >> kind of independence of thought and action which is an outstanding >> >> >> characteristic of both US and Israeli pilots and aircrew. >> >> >> >> Soviet doctrine failed, not neccesarily the technology. >> >> >> > Technology has trouble succeeding without the human touch involved. >> >> >> What is bad for the communists is that the very essence of thier >> >> system discourages the kind of independent thinking so crucial to >> >> good combat pilots. GCI works if you cut loose the pilot at a certain >> >> point and if the pilot is capable of independent thinking so he can >> >> react to the situation. Soviet style GCI took the pilots right up to >> >> the shoot point and required a command to open fire. These pilots >> >> were far to dependent on thier controllers and did not operate with >> >> thier eyes out of the aircraft enough. In cases where good NVA pilots >> >> mixed it up with US pilots and shook off thier GCI they acquited >> >> themselves well, but there were never enough of those pilots around. >> >> >> -- >> >> "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, >> >> therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their >> >> meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may >> >> make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure." >> >> >> �Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, 1823 >> >> Thud Ridge was from RD. At Dawn We Slept was from me. > > Ah, thanks. My memory isn't what it use to be, and probably never > was. :-) Who am i again? 8) > >> I'll make a note and see >> what I can pull off the shelf. A lot of what I have is for modelling >> purposes but I like having history mixed in. >> >> BTW if you liked ADWS you need to read Miracle at Midway (same author). > > That's now on my purchase list. > >> I feel >> it is a better written book mainly because the war was already on and >> there is none of the political silliness and manuevering in it. It is >> just IJN and USN prep for the battle in detail plus many details about >> the battle itself I hadn't known before, which is saying something. >> > > If Miracle at Midway is a better book than At Dawn We Slept, it will > be a terrific book indeed. > >> Also Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy is also fabulous. > > I may have that on my list already; if not, it will be added. (I > figure I'll be dead about twenty years or so before I finish reading > all the books on my current list.) > >> These 3 >> books together give a perspective that is much broader and deeper than >> almost anything else I have read. I developed considerably more respect >> for the junior officers and enlisted of the IJN and a lot less for the >> senior commanders. Whatever positives Yamamoto may have had he really >> wasn't that much of genius at least not in the context of how he was >> used in WWII. > > If I recall correctly, Genda had much to do with the planning, and > wanted to carry it further than Yamamoto. There was considerable differences in both battles as to what was the real goal. One gets the impression that despite the supposed rigid mentality of the Japanese mind there was a lot of outright, almost disrespectful differences between different grades. Nagumo was always to cautious and despite his rank I beleive his officers did not really respect him as much as they should have. I am of the opinion that if more facilties damage had been done a Pearl some repairs, like Yorktown right before Midway could not have been done and that may have influenced that battle. I am also of the opinion, and a lot of people disagree with me, that had the Japanese not lost hier nerve, even after losing 4 carriers they could have occupied Midway. they had sufficent surfce combatants and the US airgroups were quite depleted by then. Yes I know SBDs attacked Mikuma and Mogami but still the US had to be getting near the end of it's rope at that point. And had the Japanese not so split thier forces they would have still had some fighters available. > >> Despite >> all the detailed planning for Pearl harbor I think you'll agree the >> attack itself despite all the immediate damage was not a tactical >> victory at all. The focus on the battleships and not the facitlites was >> a tremendous error. > > The immediate damage was just that; the Japanese knew they couldn't > take out the US, only slow it down enough to try to complete their > southern plans. Had the attack included possession of Hawaii ... > well, the results eventually would have been the same, but perhaps > dragged out longer. Occupation? That would have been a very long and tenuous tether to hold onto. But a more effective attack? Very much in the cards. > >> And >> Midway with it's set piece metality and divided forces and the grievous >> underestimation of American capabilities was catastrophic. Could it be >> said that Yamamoto actually won any battle? Perhaps like the Allies >> realized Hitler did them more good alive than dead and stopped all >> attempts to assasinate him in '43 perhaps Yamamoto should have been left >> to plan some more of his grand battles. >> > > Huh; hadn't thought of that. Of course, I'm not a real historian by > any stretch; I'd have to study a few more years just to reach amateur > status. > >> -- >> "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, therefore, >> be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not >> to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean >> everything or nothing at pleasure." >> >> �Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, 1823 > > -- "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure." �Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, 1823 |